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Abstract 
Public radio in the United States receives both direct and indirect government funding. 
Direct subsidies come in the form of lump-sum and matching grants, while indirect subsidies 
proceed from tax revenues foregone on deductible private donations. Each of these sources of 
government money impacts charitable giving to public radio. This paper estimates both of these 
effects, using data on a national sample of public radio stations in the United States from 1990-
96. I find that public funding to stations has a positive impact on private giving, but this impact 
rapidly decreases as the level of government subsidies increases, ultimately becoming negative. 
The analysis also indicates that increases in state tax rates correspond with higher donation 
levels. This paper explores the implications of these and other findings for policymakers, public 
administrators, and nonprofit managers. 
Introduction 
Public radio in the United States has had a controversial tenure since the passage of the 
Public Broadcasting Act of 1967.1 The main actors in the public radio movement—most 
prominently, National Public Radio (NPR), Public Radio International (PRI) and Pacifica—have 
been dogged by allegations of left-wing bias (Douglas 1999) or that they have displaced 
legitimate commercial activity (Berry and Waldfogel 1999). As such, the relationship between 
public radio and Republican-led governments since the early 1990s has been troubled, at best. 
Some observers find it miraculous that the Corporation for Public Broadcasting (CPB), for 
example, survived the 104th Congress of 1995-96 (Walker 1997). 
The political polemics surrounding public radio tend to obscure the day-to-day fiscal 
challenges for public administrators and nonprofit managers involved in this industry. These 
challenges begin with understanding the basic composition of income. First, government funding 
for public broadcasting in general, and public radio in particular, is substantial. At present, it 
constitutes one-third of total revenues. This is reflected in Figure 1, which shows the breakdown 
of funding sources to public broadcasting in 1998. 
Figure 1. Funding for Public Broadcasting, 1998 
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The 33 percent of funding from government in Figure 1 is somewhat misleading, 
however, because this only refers to direct public funding. Public radio and television stations, 
like all 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations, receive indirect government support through the 
                                                          
1 47 USC Sec. 396. 
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special tax treatment of charitable contributions. Technically, governments pick up a portion of 
private contributions through contributors’ tax deductions. This is an important funding 
mechanism for nonprofits, created explicitly to fund public goods and services without direct 
government intervention (Hall 1987). For most nonprofits, indirect funding is greater than direct 
funding—it makes up two-thirds to three-quarters of all government subsidies to the arts, for 
example (Schuster 1987; Feld, O’Hara and Schuste. 1983). 
Understanding the funding stream for public radio is complicated by the fact that the 
direct and indirect government funding might impact an even larger portion of revenues: the 46 
percent that comes from the support of individuals, foundations, and corporations. This impact 
could occur in two ways. First, higher or lower levels of direct government support might change 
giving behavior by leveraging (“crowding in”) or displacing (“crowding out”) private giving 
(Brooks 2000a). Second, changes in income tax rates might alter incentives to give charitably, as 
the “price of giving” is affected (Steinberg 1990). Both of these resource interactions need to be 
considered in the course of performing an analysis of the costs and benefits of fiscal policies and 
management decisions. 
A number of papers have looked at direct and indirect impacts separately for nonprofit 
organizations, but few studies to date have considered them simultaneously. This paper does so 
for public radio, using data on 104 public stations in the United States from 1990-96. While it 
focuses on the specific case of public radio, this study produces empirical findings and policy 
tools for public administrators and nonprofit managers in other fields as well. 
The rest of this paper is organized in four parts. It begins with background on the history 
and structure of public radio’s funding, and the literature on direct and indirect funding to 
nonprofit organizations. Next, data and models are introduced to perform regression anaysis on 
the impacts of government funding on private donations. Third, the regression results are 
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presented and interpreted. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the 
results for policymakers, public administrators, and nonprofit managers. 
Background 
Public Radio in the United States 
Public radio in the United States was basically nonexistent before passage of the Public 
Broadcasting Act of 1967 (Engelman 1996). This Act grew out of the findings of the Carnegie 
Commission on Educational Television (1967), which argued that publicly-controlled media was 
integral to the social reforms of the time. The Act established the CPB, with an initial 
appropriation of $5 million for 1969 (about $24 million in year 2001 dollars). This quickly rose 
through the 1970s to over $300 million in today’s dollars; since then it has fluctuated around this 
level, reflecting in large measure the changing fortunes of political forces sympathetic to its 
funding. Figure 2 shows CPB funding from its inception to the present. 
Figure 2. Corporation for Public Broadcasting Appropriations 
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  Source: Corporation for Public Broadcasting 
 
While the CPB ushered in the era of public broadcasting, it subsequently came to 
constitute just one part of its funding. Indeed, today it is only 12 percent of total public 
broadcasting revenues, and is accompanied by a number of other government and private sources 
of funding, as was illustrated in Figure 1. 
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The Relationship between Public Subsidies and Private Giving 
Direct government funding of public broadcasting in general (and of public radio in 
particular) consists of two parts. The first are lump-sum grants; the second are matching grants 
based on Nonfederal Financial Support (NFFS) to stations: contributions from individuals, 
corporations, and foundations. The sizes of the lump-sum and matching portions follow CPB and 
other government formulas that generally take into account listener bases, minority populations, 
and other criteria (Straub 1999). As a general rule, however, higher private contribution levels 
translate into higher levels of direct public support in subsequent years. 
A number of authors in public administration and economics have studied the effect of 
government funding to nonprofit organizations (such as public radio stations) on private 
donations. In terms of direct funding, this is the “crowding out” question: Do government 
subsidies displace private donations, or leverage them? On the one hand, private donors might be 
encouraged to give more when the government contributes, due to reputational effects, better 
information about recipients, and (especially in public radio’s case) matching-fund arrangements. 
On the other hand, donors may perceive less “need” when the government funds a nonprofit 
organization, and therefore donate less. 
Authors have generally modeled the problem within the traditional public-goods 
provision framework. For example, say agent k consumes a public good P and a private 
composite good x. Define person k’s utility with the function 
 ( ),k ku u x P= .                 (1) 
Denominating each in dollar quantities, he consumes P=C+G and xk of each, respectively, where 
C is the total level of private donations to the public good and G is the level of government 
contributions. Assume that ∑=
i
icC , where Φ∈i  is the set of all donors; and ∑=
j
jgG , 
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where jg  is taxpayer j’s tax bill, and Ω∈j  is the set of all taxpayers. Person k’s problem can be 
described as: 
 ( ){ }GCxu kk +,max , subject to 
 0≥kc  (so all contributions are non-negative), and 
 kkkk mgcx ≤++ , where m is income. 
Predictions about the relationship between C and G generally depend on the assumptions 
about the overlap between donors and taxpayers. For example, Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984) 
assume that Ω=Φ , which leads to the conclusion that 1−=∂
∂
G
C ; that is, government support 
displaces private donations on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986), 
however, assume that Ω⊂Φ  but Ω≠Φ , suggesting that 01 <∂
∂<−
G
C . 
In support of the latter result, the most common finding in the (fairly large) empirical 
literature has been that of partial crowding out (e.g., Steinberg 1993). The most common finding 
is that a dollar in government support of a nonprofit organization displaces between 10 and 50 
cents in private giving (Brooks 2000a). 
In a study specifically about public radio, Kingma (1989) found that an extra $10,000 in 
total government money to a station crowded out about 15 cents from each individual donor. 
This is consistent with most studies on arts and culture nonprofits, although it is notable that 
Hughes and Luksetich (1999) found a crowding-in relationship between state funding to history 
museums and private giving. 
The most recent work on crowding out has suggested that the relationship between 
subsidies and donations is probably not linear. For instance, Brooks (2000b) found that for 
nonprofit performing arts organizations, low levels of government subsidies crowded in private 
donations. When subsidy levels became high enough, however (after they reached about 25 
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percent of the organizations' total budgets), a crowding out effect occurred as nonprofits began to 
look increasingly like quasi-governmental agencies. 
In contrast with direct subsidies, indirect government funding to public radio comes from 
forgone tax revenues. For example, say a contributor to public radio has an effective marginal 
tax rate of m (where 0<m<1), and itemizes deductions for charitable contributions on his or her 
income tax returns. Each dollar in income donated results in a deduction of m. Hence, if the 
taxpayer donates D dollars in income to the local public radio station, the government indirectly 
pays mD of this donation. 
Studies of the effects of indirect government funding have focused on the impact that 
changes to income tax rates have on donations (e.g., Clotfelter 1985). Most papers look at 
individual-level tax data to estimate these effects, and have not generally focused on donations to 
specific recipient organizations—such as public radio stations. These studies always hold 
consumer income constant, so it is not surprising that donation levels increase with tax rates—as 
rates rise, government picks up more of the donation to a nonprofit. In a meta-analysis of the 
economic analyses on this topic, Steinberg (1990) found that on average, a 10 percent increase in 
the tax rate leads to about a 12 percent increase in charitable donations. 
Data and Models 
The empirical analysis that follows will seek to estimate both direct and indirect 
government funding impacts on private giving to public radio. To answer these questions, this 
study employs an uneven panel of 104 public radio stations over the period 1990-96. The data 
were compiled from CPB records and initially analyzed by researchers at the University of 
Wisconsin in 1999 (Straub 1999). They represent all nonprofit radio stations with assets of more 
than $10 million, as well as a probability sample of smaller stations.2 
                                                          
2 The full dataset includes more than 400 observations over several years. I have selected the one year’s sample 
containing the largest number of stations. 
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The dataset includes information on private donations, government funding from various 
sources, earned revenues, expenditures on fundraising, potential listenership, coverage area, and 
affiliations with NPR and/or a sister television station. I have augmented these data with state tax 
rates (Federation of Tax Administrators 2001) and per capita personal income (Statistical 
Abstract of the United States 2000). Federal tax rates are not included, because all stations have 
listeners that are subject to the same rates. 
Given the fact that data on individual donors’ tax rates and incomes are not available, 
each state’s maximum income tax rate (which should capture the variance in the average tax rate 
for donors) and the average income for the station’s state are used instead. To obviate the 
problem of comparability of stations of dramatically different sizes, the monetary variables are 
divided by the size of their estimated potential listenerships to create per capita measures. This 
also eliminates a possible source of omitted variable bias, in that a station’s listener base should 
affect both its donations and the size of its government grant. 
Table 1 describes the data for the one year (1995) that provides the largest single cross-
section (91 stations). 
Table 1. Summary of Public Radio Data, 91 Stations in 1995* 
Variable Definition Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
DONATED 
REVENUES 
Donations per potential 
listener 
$5.94 $11.20 $0 $76.15 
GOVERNMENT 
SUBSIDIES 
Government funding per 
potential listener 
$6.51 $20.74 $0 $133.32 
EARNED 
REVENUE 
Earned income per potential 
listener 
$3.63 $7.96 $0 $50.27 
FUNDRAISING 
EXPENSES 
Expenses on fundraising 
and development per 
potential listener 
$1.40 $3.24 $0 $22.78 
MAXIMUM 
STATE TAX 
RATE 
Maximum tax rate for 
station’s state of 
incorporation 
5.12% 3.38% 0% 12% 
PER CAPITA 
PERSONAL 
INCOME 
Personal income per capita 
in station’s metropolitan 
area or state 
$23,527 $2,850 $18,223 $31,732 
COVERAGE 
AREA 
Area covered by station 
signal (square miles) 
4,909 5,122 38  25,227 
NPR AFFILIATE Station is an NPR affiliate 
(dummy variable) 
0.73  0 1 
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TV STATION Station has a sister 
television station (dummy 
variable) 
0.21  0 1 
    Source: Author’s Calculations. 
 
Estimation begins with an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to test the effects of 
government subsidies, state tax rates, other revenues, expenses, station characteristics, and 
personal income on the level of private donations directed to each station. To allow for the 
possibility of both crowding in and crowding out (depending on government subsidy levels), 
following Brooks (2000b), Equation 1 also includes the squared value of government funding. A 
finding of crowding in at low levels of government funding—followed by crowding out at higher 
levels—would be indicated by a positive coefficient on the linear government funding term, but 
a negative coefficient on the squared term. Model 1 is specified as: 
2
1 2 3 4i i i s i iD G G T Xα β β β β ε= + + + + +              (2) 
where Di is the level of private donations per listener for station i, Gi is the level of government 
funding per listener, Ts is the tax rate in state s (where station i is located), Xi is a vector of the 
other regressors, and εi is a random disturbance. Model 1 estimates equation (2) for the entire 
uneven panel, while Model 2 only looks at a single year, 1995. In the former case, X contains a 
trend term to neutralize year-specific effects in the panels. 
Since the left-hand side variable is censored at zero, I also employ a tobit specification to 
estimate equation (2). I calculate the marginal effects for each of the coefficients as 
[ ] =∂∂ σββθ XX XDE |
*
, where θ is the proportion of the sample in which donations per capita is 
positive. 
 Traditionally, empirical studies of both crowding out and tax effects on donations suffer 
from endogeneity, necessitating the use of instrumental variables. For example, while 
government funding might affect private donations, the reverse might be true as well. And tax 
rates should impact giving, but due to deductibility, contribution levels also should affect tax 
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rates. Multi-stage approaches are not necessary with these data, however, for two reasons. First, 
the structure of government funding to public radio makes the relationship between private and 
public funds one-way. Governments collect data on donations from the previous fiscal year, and 
then make matching grants the year after that; as such, government money follows private giving 
with a two-year lag, so any association between the two in a given year must be from the former 
to the latter (Straub 1999). Second, tax rates used in my estimations are not individual donors’ 
marginal rates but rather (maximum) state rates, making them invariant to contribution levels. 
Endogeneity is also implausible for other variables such as earned income and fundraising 
expenditures: Customers of paid services are unlikely to be aware of current donation levels, and 
stations make their fundraising budget decisions based on the success of prior campaigns. 
The existing literature leads to expectations about the regression results. First, we would 
expect donations to vary positively with the tax rate. Second, we cannot predict the effect of 
government subsidies on donations, except to say that crowding in is more likely at low funding 
levels, and crowding out at higher levels. Presumably, fundraising expenses should drive up 
donations. NPR affiliation should increase donations, assuming that this makes listenership more 
valuable. Similar to government funding, higher earned revenues could drive donations either up 
or down, depending on donors’ reactions to perceived commercial success. If anything, a 
television affiliate and larger coverage area should increase donations as they enhance a station’s 
visibility. 
Regression Results 
Tables 2 and 3 present the regression estimates.3 We first note that the OLS and tobit 
results are very similar. This is not surprising, because 96 percent of the donations levels were 
non-zero in the full panel, while 98 percent were positive in the 1995 sample. 
                                                          
3 In the regressions that follow, heteroscedasticity was corrected using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent 
covariance matrix estimation technique. 
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Turning to Model 1 in the tobit specification, we see that both of the crowding-out 
coefficients are statistically significant, while the tax rate is not. (Maximum state tax rates may 
be insignificant in these data because of the lack of variance in this measure across the panels.) 
Government subsidies to public radio stations crowd in private donations per capita at a rate of 
about 27 cents on the first dollar of subsidies, but this effect diminishes with subsequent 
government funding. Model 2’s results are slightly different. First, for the 1995 panel, tax rates 
were significant: A 1-point increase in the maximum state tax rate corresponded with a 32-cent 
increase in donations per capita. Second, the while the first dollar government funding crowded 
in about 63 cents, this effect decreased at about twice the rate as in Model 1. 
Table 2. OLS Estimates Measuring Influences on Donations per Listener to Public Radio 
 
 Coefficient (standard error) 
Independent variable 
 
Model 1 (Full panel) Model 2 (1995 only) 
INTERCEPT -0.1928 
(2.4397) 
0.2296 
(3.214) 
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 0.366*** 
(0.1166) 
0.7143** 
(0.2935) 
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 
SQUARED 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.0033+ 
(0.0024) 
MAXIMUM STATE TAX 
RATE 
0.0491 
(0.1579) 
0.3109** 
(0.1431) 
EARNED REVENUE -0.0175* 
(0.0104) 
-0.2126 
(0.148) 
FUNDRAISING EXPENSES 1.3625*** 
(0.5083) 
1.5886*** 
(0.538) 
PER CAPITA PERSONAL 
INCOME 
0.00012 
(0.00015) 
0.00001 
(0.00014) 
COVERAGE AREA -0.000033 
(0.000068) 
0.000089 
(0.000099) 
NPR AFFILIATE++ -1.144 
(0.7473) 
-1.5674 
(1.2822) 
TV STATION++ -0.7124 
(0.9626) 
-0.1575 
(1.0699) 
TREND 0.0828 
(0.2587) 
 
   
Adjusted R2 .38 .76 
N 400 91 
    * Significant at the .10 level. 
    ** Significant at the .05 level. 
    *** Significant at the .01 level. 
      + Significant at the .17 level. 
      ++ Dummy variable 
   Source: Author’s Calculations. 
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Table 3. Tobit Estimates Measuring Influences on Donations Per Listener to Public Radio 
 
 Coefficient (standard error) [marginal effect] 
Independent variable Model 1 (Full panel) Model 2 (1995 only) 
INTERCEPT 0.2616 (4.82) 
[0.1859] 
0.1655 (4.5638) 
[0.1456] 
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 0.3861*** (0.0604) 
[0.2743] 
0.7209*** (0.1239) 
[0.6342] 
GOVERNMENT SUBSIDIES 
SQUARED 
-0.0018*** (0.0004) 
[-0.0013] 
-0.0033*** (0.001) 
[-0.0029] 
MAXIMUM STATE TAX 
RATE 
0.0437 (0.1725) 
[0.0311] 
0.3237* (0.1856) 
[0.2847] 
EARNED REVENUE -0.025** (0.0123) 
[-0.0178] 
-0.2176*** (0.0791) 
[-0.1914] 
FUNDRAISING EXPENSES 1.3601*** (0.1912) 
[0.9663] 
1.5642*** (0.2092) 
[1.3759] 
PER CAPITA PERSONAL 
INCOME 
0.000093 (0.000212) 
[0.000066] 
0.000012 (0.00019) 
[0.00001] 
COVERAGE AREA -0.000013 (0.000112) 
[-0.000009] 
0.000091 (0.000113) 
[0.00008] 
NPR AFFILIATE++ -1.3041 (1.1862) 
[-0.9265] 
-1.5964 (1.2979) 
[-1.4042] 
TV STATION++ -0.4696 (1.2349) 
[-0.3336] 
-0.089 (1.3459) 
[-0.0783] 
TREND 0.1093 (0.3354) 
[0.0776] 
 
   
N 400 91 
     * Significant at the .10 level. 
     ** Significant at the .05 level. 
     *** Significant at the .01 level. 
        + Significant at the .17 level. 
        ++ Dummy variable 
    Source: Author’s Calculations. 
 
 A simple simulation based on the full-sample regression results shows that crowding out 
begins when government funding per capita reaches about $106. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4 
At the highest rate of government funding in this sample of stations ($233 per capita), each 
dollar in public subsidies crowds out about 33 cents in private donations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4 This simulation is conducted as follows. Say the regression yields 3
2
21
ˆˆˆˆ βββα XGGD +++= . The rate of 
crowding out at any particular level of G is then G
G
D
21
ˆ2ˆ ββ +=∂
∂
. The levels of G in the simulation correspond 
to the range of values found in the sample. 
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Figure 3. Crowding In or Crowding Out of Private Donations at Different Levels of Government Support Per 
Capita 
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  Source: Author’s Calculations. 
 
The other coefficients in the models are generally consistent with one another. In Model 
1, a dollar increase in fundraising expenditure leads to an increase of 97 cents in donations, while 
it leads to $1.38 in Model 2. Earned revenue is significant in both models. In Model 1, an 
additional earned dollar displaces about 2 cents in donations per listener, whereas it crowds out 
about 19 cents in Model 2. Statistically insignificant variables in both models include coverage 
area, NPR and television affiliations, the time trend, and per capita personal income.5 
From the standpoint of the nonprofit economics literature, the estimates in this paper 
indicate an unusual relationship between government funds and private donations, at least at 
relatively low levels of government funding. With the exception of a few studies such as that by 
Hughes and Luksetich (1999) and the work on social welfare nonprofits by Schiff (1990, 1985), 
crowding in is not a typical finding. The explanation for this surely lies in the unusually stringent 
matching-grant requirements for government money to public radio stations, which essentially 
“hardwire in” the crowding-in phenomenon. 
                                                          
5 The insignificance of this last variable is mildly surprising, given the typical finding that income correlates 
strongly with giving (Steinberg 1997). However, the measure of personal income is an average figure for a station’s 
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While this paper’s tax effect is consistent with Kingma’s (1989) public radio study, the 
crowding-in finding is not. This may be attributable to the fact that his estimations employed 
quite different data—those on individual donations (instead of aggregate donations to stations) 
from nine years earlier than my data. In addition, Kingma’s measure of public support contained 
all sources (government and private) of income besides station memberships, and as such 
measured a somewhat different relationship than that here. From a public administration 
perspective, however, separating out government subsidies is critical for understanding the 
specific impact of this policy tool. 
Implications for Public Administrators and Nonprofit Managers 
To summarize the central findings, the data suggest the following for public radio 
stations: 
1. Low levels of public funding to stations have a leveraging impact on private giving, but this 
impact rapidly decreases as the magnitude of government subsidies increases. At high levels 
of government funding, public dollars displace private donations. 
2. Increases in state tax rates correspond with more in donations per capita to public radio. 
It is appropriate in this paper to remain agnostic as to whether, on balance, public radio is 
a good or bad thing from an economic or political perspective. Indeed, such discussion would 
have to delve into whether public radio functions as a public good, as well as the proper role of 
government in the provision of public goods and services (Kingma and McClelland 1995). The 
introduction to this paper pointed out that some argue that public radio serves an important 
positive social purpose, while others argue just as strongly that it destroys private-sector value 
and tends to promote a particular political viewpoint. These issues are outside the scope of this 
article. Instead, this research sheds light on the effects of policy tools on public radio’s finances, 
for good or ill. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
state, which is quite imprecise and perhaps not especially characteristic of the income of public radio donors. This 
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For most nonprofit organizations, direct government funding is a mixed blessing. As 
previously noted, crowding out is ubiquitous across the sector, meaning that in the short term, 
most nonprofits sacrifice part of their private support when they accept public support. In the 
long term, the problem may be even worse, if crowding out adversely affects habits in charitable 
giving. For public radio, however, this wouldn’t appear to be a problem (except at 
extraordinarily high funding levels). As a matter of fact, these results may lead one to speculate 
that long-term giving habits might possibly be fostered by moderate levels of government 
support for public radio. 
It appears that these direct government leveraging effects are a function of the matching-
grant structure of public radio funding. As such, policies to build partnerships between 
governments and other types of nonprofits might ameliorate problems with crowding out through 
similar schemes. This is especially germane to current discussion about the federal government’s 
initiatives to partner with faith-based nonprofit organizations for the provision of social and 
human welfare services.  
Note that governments can structure their funding to social service nonprofits in a way 
that matches each private dollar (although not necessarily one-for-one), but still expends the 
same amount of resources as at present. If the current subsidy to a nonprofit is S and the expected 
level of donations is Dˆ , the match per dollar to keep expenditures even should be 
D
S
ˆ . Naturally, 
calculating this matching rate requires an accurate prediction of donations, but ample data on the 
nonprofit sector exist to make a reasonable attempt at such a prediction. 
The effects of income tax changes on donations to public radio are similar to the impacts 
on other types of nonprofit organizations. All else constant, higher tax rates lead to more 
donations via government paying a larger part of the gift. However, it doesn’t necessarily follow 
that public radio proponents should automatically despair from tax cuts at the federal or state 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
variable might simply not be of high-enough quality to capture real existing correlation. 
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level. The tax rate coefficients estimated in the regressions look at taxes in isolation, whereas in 
reality a tax cut would radiate through other variables of interest in determining donation levels. 
Most notably, while income is statistically insignificant in my models, this result is unusual. 
Steinberg (1990) found that on average, a 10 percent increase in income led to a 6.5 percent 
increase in charitable giving. Thus, if a tax cut spurs work incentives and increases income, it 
may lead to more in contributions, not less. In addition, public radio proponents would likely 
find it hard to sell tax increases to state legislators merely for the indirect benefits they provide to 
public radio stations. 
Finally, while the conclusion in Model 2 about the impact of fundraising expenditures 
should be encouraging for nonprofit managers who spend a good deal of their time on donor 
development, it should be interpreted with a degree of caution. Other work on arts and culture 
nonprofits has suggested that the impact of fundraising can vary dramatically according to 
organization size (Brooks 1997). Future research on public radio (and other nonprofits) could 
examine such scale effects in greater depth. 
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